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1. The debate on the taxation of CO2 emissions in the European Union  
 
At the beginning of the nineties, in the context of preparing for the Rio Earth Summit, 
the European Union (EU) was considering the possibility of establishing a harmonized tax on 
fossil fuels burdening each of them differently — according to the carbon emissions associated 
with their use. A carbon tax increases the price of fossil fuel energy products and reduces their 
consumption. This leads to overall energy savings as well as investments in efficiency 
improvements and changes the consumption and production structures making them less energy 
intensive. 
The debate in the European Union faced many vicissitudes. In June of 1992 the 
Commission presented a directive proposal (COM (92) 226 final; European Commission, 1992). 
According to this proposal, a national tax of mixed type would be established through which the 
different forms of energy would be taxed according to their energy content and to the CO2 
emissions emitted in their use. In general, renewable energies would be exempt. Although the 
hydroelectric energy generated in units with a power greater than 10 megawatts was burdened 
with a reduced rate. The tax was specifically designed so that i  the case of petroleum, half of 
the tax burden would come from its energy content and the other half from its carbon content. 
The tax rates were fixed so that at the moment of their application, 1993, petroleum would 
support a tax equivalent to $3 per barrel that would increase until reaching a value of $10 per 
barrel in 2000, which would be achieved with a tax of about $22 per ton of CO2 (O’Con or,
1997). Important exemptions were planned for the most energy-intensive industrial sectors. The 
application of these types of exemptions has been a general characteristic in the introduction of 
ecotaxes in Europe and it has just been denounced as a factor that reduces the environmental 
effectiveness of these taxes (Ekins and Speck, 1999). One of the most significant p int  was that 
the practical application of the directive was conditional to its main competitors of the OECD 
establishing similar tax measures. 
In spite of the moderated and cautious nature of the proposal, the resolved opposition of 
some governments thwarted the initiative. It can be noted that when environmental policy 
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decisions affect the tax system, the current regulation of the EU requires that they are accepted 
unanimously. Thus any decision about environmental taxation can be blocked — evenby nly 
one country of the EU.  
 In May of 1995 a new directive proposal was outlined (COM (95) 172 final; European 
Commission, 1995). Although the content of the proposal was very similar, an important 
modification was introduced. The directive fixed the harmonized structure of the tax, but the 
member states could, during a transitional period, fix the tax rates freely. The rates planned for 
the year 2000 -equivalent to a tax of $10 per barrel in the case of petroleum- were not 
obligatory, but a “target rate” on which member states would try to converge. In spite of these 
changes, the directive failed again because of government opposition of some countries. Even 
more moderate and partial proposals such as the one of March 1997 (COM (97) final; European 
Commission, 1997), consisting of increasing the harmonized minimum rates in several phases 
on some energy products, have still been blocked — m stly due to the opposition of the Spanish 
government. 
It should be pointed out that the proposals, both the one of 1992 and the one of 1995, 
consisted of the harmonization of minimum taxation levels, but not a tax collected at the level of 
the European Union as an own resource. This last possibility has been practically nonexistent in 
the debate. However, in a European Commission report (1993) about EU revenue sources, one 
section is devoted to possible new own resources and the possibility of a CO2 tax s c nsidered. 
It appears, among other alternatives, as the one that fulfils more favorable criteria (Table 31, p. 
85); according to this report “there exists also a clear economic case for assigning the ensuing 
revenue to the supranational level of government.” (p. 91) 
While application of the tax at the European level is blocked, some countries have 
decided to apply carbon taxes (Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, and Italy), while 
others (Austria and Germany) have opted for increasing energy taxes. In addition to these taxes, 
there are other taxes that also affect energy products and the implicit tax on carbon varies a lot
among the different energy products and the different EU countries (Baranzini, et al., 2000). 
This creates serious problems when trying to implement international coordinated taxes.  
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2. Harmonized national taxes or international tax?  
 
The theoretical economic argument for a unique tax on a global problem is that it faces 
the problem in a more efficient way. With a unique tax the marginal “costs” of reducing 
emissions tend to equalize, thus achieving a joint reduction of emissions at a smaller total 
“cost”.1 Several empirical studies show that a unique economic instrument for different 
countries leads to a reduction at a smaller cost than applying the instrument individually. 
Among them, Conrad and Schmidt (1998) and Barker (1999) estimate that the necessary tax rate 
to reduce Community emissions to a certain level is lower in the case of a coordinated tax than 
in the case of non-c ordinated taxes.  
However, these arguments do not allow for deciding between the two alternatives of 
introducing unique tax rates: national harmonized taxes or international tax. A unique world-
wide tax is quite unthinkable for the moment and the proposal is not on the agenda. But it is 
perfectly conceivable that an entity like the EU, which has a Community budget with reven es 
and expenditures, can decide to introduce a supranational tax of this type as an own resource. 
Nevertheless, the specific proposals that have been suggested consist of harmonized taxes that 
would become part of the revenues of each country.  
Some advantages of a tax levied and collected at the EU level are listed below.  
 
a) Greater incentives for environmental policies. The strategies for reducing greenhouse 
emissions are established, to a great extent, at a national level. As the problem is a 
global one, the typical free-rid r problems appear, not only at the level of individual 
economic agents, but also at the governmental level. With an international tax, any unit 
reduction would imply a reduction in the net contribution of each country to the budget 
of the European Union. This could reduce the aforementioned problems. With a 
harmonized tax, a country would not be interested in making the effort that reducing 
emissions implies and could reduce other taxes or tax substitutive goods (renewable 
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energies) and so its productive and consumption structure would remain unchanged 
(Hoel, 1992). Consequently, it is foreseeable that, in order to achieve the same level of 
global reduction, the harmonized tax rate required would be higher than the 
international tax nd would yield more inefficiencies.2 
 
b) An international tax avoids the possible perverse effect that could imply turning 
environmental taxation into an important part of the public revenues of a country. Since 
the success of the policies for reducing enviro m tal impacts would reduce the tax 
base and thus the fiscal revenues, it could be possible that the governments will not be 
interested in the success of this tax in order to avoid the “fiscal erosion”. This problem 
disappears with an international tax (although, concerning environmental policies, it 
could move to the supranational level).  
 
c) An international tax generates an own source of budget revenues, which can be 
considered positive if one thinks that the economic union should be accompanied by a 
bigger budgetary expenditure.3 The objective of the taxes analyzed here is not that of 
obtaining revenues. However, a carbon tax is a clear example of an environmental tax 
that would generate important revenues for the public sector, even though it has to be 
noted that, with other things remaining unchanged, the more effective the tax is from 
the environmental point of view the lower the revenues will be. In the simulations 
shown later, in the specific case of the EU, a tax levied on CO2 could mean -at least in 
the short term- significantly bigger revenues than the current level of EU budgetary 
expenditures.  
 
d) A more controversial question is that of the advantages or disadvantages of a 
harmonized or supranational tax from the point of view of the distribution among 
countries. It is possible that an international tax could have regressive effects. However, 
the revenues would return in one way or another to the citizens of the EU, so that what 
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is a possible disadvantage from the distributive point of view couldbecome an 
advantage either by public expenditure or direct transfers, the effects could be highly 
positive, while a harmonized tax would not have redistributive effects among 
countries.4 Next, we review some studies on the distributional effects of environmental 
taxes -and in particular of CO2 taxes- generally inside a country. However, let us 
remember that the “progressive” redistributive effects can be a desirable characteristic 
of ecotaxes (and therefore they can guide us in their design), but the redistribution is not 
its main objective: in fact we do not want “horizontal equity” here because it is 
desirable that two countries with the same per capita income should contribute more or 
less according to its effort in reducing emissions.  
 
3. Environmental taxes and their distributive impact: a general view  
 
The issue of the distributional effects of environmental taxes has three aspects: how 
fiscal burden is distributed, what distributive effects the use of the revenues has (the bigger 
expenditure and/or the reduction of other revenues) and who benefits by the positive 
environmental effects.  
The most complex aspect to study is generally the last one, that of the distribution of the 
environmental benefits (or avoided costs).5 In addition, in global problems such as climate 
change, there is a great uncertainty about the avoided costs and these do not only affect the 
inhabitants of a certain country but also -and mainly- to future generations and the inhabitants of 
other places in the world.6 
Empirical research has generally focused on the first subject, that of the allocation of the 
fiscal burden, and it has usually been discussed regarding the effects that a “national” tax 
(though maybe harmonized for different countries) would have inside a country for the differe  
social groups, classified according to their income or expenditure levels. Actually, most studies 
refer to taxes on non-renewable energy and/or on carbon emissions. 
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The initial aforementioned studies only took into account the direct effects based on th  
energy purchases by the different families (data that are usually obtained from surveys of family 
expenditure) but not the direct and indirect effects of a rise in the price of energy that would 
affect all economic sectors. In general, it was shown that as well as the percentage of the total 
expenditure devoted to energy consumption for domestic use tended to decrease with the level 
of income or expenditure, on the other hand the expenditure in motor fuel performed the 
opposite. According to Poterba (1991) a carbon tax would be regressive for the United States, 
though the regressivity was much lower if the reference variable was household expenditure 
rather than household income. In the case of the United Kingdom, the studies concluded that the 
effects of a tax on non-re ewable energies would be regressive because the groups of lower 
income would confront a greater increase in prices than the groups of higher income (Smith, 
1992). However, the results could not be generalized for all the European countries. Following 
the comparative study of Smith, the regressive effects would be significant in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom while in other countries, like Italy and Spain, a tax of this kind would probably 
have proportional effects for the different income levels, a result confirmed in later studies (e.g. 
Pearson, 1995). 
However, the distributive effects of a CO2 tax (and in general of any energy tax) should 
also take into account how the different goods and services are affected in their prices. For this 
object, the information derived from input-output relationships of the different sectors has to be 
used. These relationships should have a sufficiently high disaggregation level and should be 
compatible with the expenditure classification of the family budgetary surveys. These studies 
are more complex and less abundant, among them we can mention the one of Biesiot and 
Noorman (1999) for the Netherlands, which concluded that the mean elasticity of the total use 
of energy with relation to the income level was 0.8, although families with similar income levels 
but different lifestyles had very different levels of energy requirements. An elasticity less than 
the unit would lead us to foresee that, in principle, the effects of a tax would very likely be 
regressive. 
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Other studies also introduce assumptions about the changes that a tax could operate in 
the demand function of the different goods (altering the structure of consumption) for the 
different groups of families according to their income or expenditure level. These studies are 
very interesting but in general are very limited because of their very high aggregation level. 
Among them we can cite the one of Symons, Proops and Gay (1994) for the United Kingdom, 
the one of Cornwell and Creedy (1996) for Australia and the one of Labandeira and Labeaga 
(1999) for Spain. In the first two cases the regressive character of the carbon tax seems to be 
confirmed for the studied country, while the recent work on the Spanish case concludes that the 
direct and indirect total impact of the tax would affect, more or less proportionally, the 
consumption of the different expenditure groups.  
The reviews of Bruce et al. (1996) for the OECD, Barker and Köhler (1998) for the UE, 
the ones of the OECD (1995 and 1997), as well as the one of Sp ck (1999) show that the 
distributive implications of energy and carbon taxes would be in general slightly regressive. 
But, as most of the mentioned works outline, the ultimate effect on the income distribution is 
not independent of how the generated r venues are used.  The first possibility is to finance 
environmental projects in order to improve the effectiveness of the policies. Another possibility 
is to reduce other public revenues, an alternative that is usually associated with the term 
“environmental fiscal reform”;7 in such cases the effects would depend on the degree of 
progressivity/regressivity of the reduced revenues in relation to the new tax. 
Finally, the other alternative is to distribute these revenues, or part of them, through 
additional public expenditure or transfers. A case frequently considered in the literature is lump-
sum redistribution, that is to say, making equal monetary transfers to everybody, in which case 
the effects tend to be highly progressive. It is worthwhile to notice that this redistribution would 
be equal in its effects on the income distribution to increase public expenditure that equally 
benefits all families independent of their income level. If the per capita benefit of the public 
expenditure correlates negatively w th the income level, then the effects would be even more 
progressive from the redistributive point of view.  
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There are some examples in which the revenues from the environmental taxes are 
actually returned -in a more or less direct way- to the citizens. In Switzerland the revenues from 
different environmental taxes (domestic fuel, sulphur, and COV) are returned through a per 
capita reduction in the medical insurance. The Netherlands’ design of the small energy user’s 
tax, applied with a tax-free allowance, reduces the income tax and social taxes, which also 
compensate any regressive effect (EC, 1999, cited in Ekins and Barker, 2001).  
The approach taken in most of the studies about environmental taxation and income 
distribution has focused on the effects inside a country on the different social groups. An 
exception is the work of Whalley and Wigle (1991) that elaborates a general equilibrium model 
to discuss the effects of an international carbon tax in 6 different regions of the world (European 
Union, North America, Japan, Other OECD, Oil Exporters, Developing/Centrally planned). The 
costs of the tax under three possible designs are valued: harmonized tax on national production, 
harmonized tax levied on national consumption, and international taxes collected at world evel 
by some international organization and whose revenues are distributed on a per capita 
egalitarian basis. As could be expected, the effects are very different under the three designs. 
Under the two first cases the poorest countries are affected very negatively by the tax, though 
the distribution of the costs among countries depends on the nature of the tax: a national tax on 
production would benefit oil exporters while those countries would be very negatively affected 
in the case of taxes on consumption. In the last case –international tax with redistribution– poor 
countries are clearly favored thanks to the enormous transfers, basically from North to South 
(Whalley and Wigle, 1991, Table 7.6, p. 250 and Table 7.7., p. 255).  
In conclusion, a carbon tax does not necessarily have regressive impacts among 
countries or inside the countries - which would be an undesirable characteristic - but rather this 
depends on its design and on the use that is made of the revenues it generates.  
 
4. The distributive effects: the EU case 
 
4.1. Objective and assumptions 
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This section studies the possible effects of the introduction of a carbon tax collected at a 
Community level on the income distribution among the different countries of the European 
Union.  
The only reference in the literature about this that we know comes from a report 
(European Commission, 1993), already cited, about the possible new sources of revenues of the 
EU. This report estimates the fiscal revenues that a tax of this type would collect in any member 
state, expressed as a percentage of their GDP, and assumes that the tax is equivalent to $10 per 
barrel of oil. This is the level that the directive proposal of 1992 planned for the year 2000. The 
report does not specify the methodology f computation (for example, whether the structure of 
the tax is assumed to be exactly equal to the directive proposal or not, or whether it includes 
exemptions for some industries or not) and uses the 1989 GDP and emissions data. The 
potential revenues are estimated –in the “static assumption” that the emissions would not 
change- as 1.14% of the EU GDP, with figures between 2.45% for Greece and 0.79% for 
France. The general conclusion is that “the carbon dioxide levy looks slightly regressive, 
although the picture is by no means simple as the CO2 intensity of an economy is the outcome 
of a multitude of factors” (p. 91). 
Our paper analyzes the same issue in a much more detailed way, with up-to-date da a
and simulating different alternative models of carbon tax. In shor , we have considered a pure 
model of imposition on CO2; a mixed model 50%/50% energy-CO2 and a pure model on CO2 
but also strongly taxing nuclear energy.  
The first measure, a pure model of CO2 tax, simply consists of imposing the same tax 
rate per ton of CO2 emitted by each energy source. Therefore, it implies imposing a tax only to 
fossil energies and with different rates per unit of energy. In short, we have considered a 
positive rate of 50 euros (equivalent to almost $45 at the current exchange ate) per ton of CO2,
8 
this imposes a much higher taxation for fossil energies than the one included in the European 
directives proposal that we analyzed in Section 1. What is of fundamental interest to us is the 
regressive or progressive character of each modality of the tax application which does not 
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depend on the tax rate, although, of course, the redistributive capacity of the tax crucially 
depends on the tax rate. 
The mixed tax considered is designed so that it yields the same revenues as the pure 
CO2 tax of 50 euros per ton of CO2 (assuming that the consumption of the different types of 
energy remains unchanged). Therefore it is very similar to the European directive proposals for 
1992 and 1995. The difference is not only in the tax rates but also ex mptions for specific 
industries are not considered. These proposals introduced a mixed tax that, in the case of 
petroleum, lead to a fiscal burden that is 50% due to its energy content and 50% to its CO2 
emissions. In this article, instead, our calculations take into account the energy structure of the 
EU in 1999, therefore 50% of the fiscal revenues come from CO2 emissions and the other 50% 
from the (non-renewable) energy content. In comparison with the previous model, this implies 
not only imposing a burden on nuclear energy, but also to change the structure of the tax to 
reduce the differences between the tax burden imposed on coal, petroleum, and natural gas. 
Given the constraint of fiscal revenues equal to the ones of the pure CO2 tax, this is equivalent 
to a tax of 25 euros per ton of CO2 plus 58.44 euros per ton of equivalent petroleum (for fossil 
energies and nuclear energy; we consider all renewable energies exempt, including all energy 
generated by hydroelectric power stations).  
In the third tax model, the fiscal burden on nuclear electricity has been increased, 
establishing it in a way that it at least carries a burden equivalent to the one that would 
correspond to the production of the same electricity through the energy source with a higher 
burden, i.e. coal. We used the estimations of the International Energy Agency (2000, Table 2, p. 
93); the last available estimation of emissions for obtaining electricity from coal corresponds to 
1998 and they are very different for the different countries. In the case of the European Union 
they vary between the 541 gr. of CO2/kw-h for Denmark and the 1045 for France and Italy. We 
have taken this last figure (which is equivalent to 4.31 tons of CO2 per TEP of nuclear energy), 
so the substitution of nuclear en rgy for the energy coming from thermal power stations does 
not yield a fiscal saving. 
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The emissions from international aviation and navigation are not considered in any of 
the models. Not because we believe that they do not have to be taxed. We agree with Scher 
(2000) in that the current situation of fiscal exemption for these fuels in the European Union and 
in many other countries is scandalous and in fact represents an unacceptable subsidy to the long 
distance displacements (of tourists, goods, etc.). However, the effects of the tax on these 
emissions in the different countries would be particularly difficult to distribute.  
 
4.2. The distribution of the fiscal burden among different countries  
 
Here we analyze the distributive impacts among the different countri s of the different 
tax alternatives. The “static” assumption is that the CO2 emissions and the energy structures of 
the countries remain unchanged; however, the qualitative results would also be representative of 
a situation in which the emissions and consumption of all the countries vary more or less in the 
same proportion. We are implicitly considering that the “cost” is borne by the citizens of the 
country collecting the revenues. This can be considered a first approach; although obviously the 
reality is that the taxes affect prices which in turn affect the consumers of different goods and 
services located in other countries. This is particularly important in very interrelated economies, 
however, taking this fact into account would require using much more complex models. Every 
country (independent of its demographic weight) is treated as an observation, because we are 
not concerned with what happens internally, but in the distribution among countries.
Table I and Figure 1 show the increase in fiscal burden (as percentage of GDP) that any 
of the considered taxes would represent for the different member states, listed according to their 
per capita GDP. The relationship between per capita GDP and the tax burden is not very 
significant, however, the figure shows mildly regressive impacts that are smaller in the third tax 
design.  
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Table I. Added fiscal burden (% of GDP) that would represent different tax options 
according to the assumptions detailed in the text
 
 Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
 per capita GDP CO2 CO2-Energy CO2-Nuclear 
Portugal 10579 2.89 2.62 2.20
Greece 11149 3.47 2.95 2.64
Spain 14190 2.43 2.35 2.30
Italy 19072 1.91 1.77 1.46
France 22307 1.34 1.70 2.28
UK 22735 1.98 1.94 1.81
Belgium 22814 2.55 2.68 2.84
Netherlands 23373 2.25 2.20 1.76
Ireland 23381 2.28 2.02 1.73
Finland 23540 2.38 2.37 2.62
Germany 24149 2.07 1.99 1.94
Austria 24153 1.55 1.41 1.18
Sweden 25272 1.08 1.48 2.22
Denmark 30736 1.63 1.44 1.24
Luxembourg 41230 2.06 1.88 1.57
     
EU 21147 1.95 1.95 1.95
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Figure 1. Added tax burden of the different tax options  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first case depicts a pure CO2 tax and shows that the share of GDP that represents 
the tax varies significantly among countries. This is logical since the fiscal burden depends on 
the “intensity of carbon dioxide emission” which is different in the different countries and 
depends on two factors: carbonization index and energy intensity: 
CO2/GDP = (CO2/E)*(E/GDP) 
where E represents the use of primary energy. 
There is a certain controversy about the relative weight of both factors in explaining the 
differences of the emission intensity among countries (e.g. Ang, 1999; and Roca and Alcántara, 
2000). In our case, we see that the deviation from the mean is similar in both cases, so that they 
would have a similar weight in the explanation of the differences (Table II). The differences in 
the first factor can be easily explained because they only depend on the structure of energy 
primary sources. We can highlight the very small figures of Sweden and France, which are 
explained fundamentally by the high weight of the nuclear energy inside their energy supply; at 
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the opposite end, Greece and Ireland have high figures. In the case of Greece it is due to the 
important weight of coal and crude, while in Ireland it is because of the weight of petroleum 
products. The differences in energy intensity are more difficult to explain because they depend 
on a multitude of factors: productive structures, models of transport, energy efficiency, etc..  
 
Table II. Intensity in carbon dioxide emissions 
Index numbers 
Carbon 
intensity Carbonization 
Energy 
Intensity 
Portugal 148.6 120.2 123.7
Greece 178.2 142.7 124.9
Spain 124.8 106.6 117.2
Italy 98.2 115.2 85.3
France 69.0 65.7 105.1
UK 101.6 108.5 93.7
Belgium 130.7 94.3 138.6
Netherlands 115.7 107.0 108.1
Ireland 116.9 134.6 86.8
Finland 122.0 79.5 153.4
Germany 106.4 112.9 94.2
Austria 79.5 98.4 80.8
Sweden 55.3 43.3 127.8
Denmark 83.7 125.4 66.7
Luxembourg 106.0 107.9 98.2
EU 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
Standard 
deviation 30.05 24.88 22.94
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In summary, the relative fiscal burden of the CO2 tax depends directly on the relative 
carbon intensity. In this case, it causes a mildly regressive effect mostly because of the bigger 
fiscal burden on the part of the three countries with smaller per capita GDP of the Union. Two 
countries especially well treated by this first option are France and Sweden. In the other two tax 
designs, the three countries with smaller per capita GDP also have a bigger increase in the fiscal 
burden than the mean of the EU but the difference is less pronounced. 
In general, if we compare the CO2- nergy design with the first model, the significant 
change is that now the nuclear energy is also taxed and there is an additional change as well: the 
countries with higher use of coal would be favored, while the users of natural gas would not be 
as favored as in the first model.9  
Lastly, the CO2-nuclear tax, as we have defined it, differentiates from the CO2 tax 
structure only in that now the energy generated by nuclear power stations is taxed in a 
significant way. The result is that France and Sweden, the countries most favored by the first 
tax, now have an increase in the fiscal burden bigger than the mean of the EU.  
In order to quantitatively anal ze the progressive or regressive character of the different 
tax models considered, we will first estimate the Kakwani index for each case. We are only 
interested in measuring the effects on the per capita income distribution among countries, so we 
will treat the population of each country as if the internal distribution were completely 
egalitarian (as use to be assumed in inequality analyses at regional level). This index indicates 
whether the distribution of what is paid for the tax (shown by the concentration curve of the tax, 
ordering the countries not according to the tax variable but to the per capita income variable) is 
more or less unequal than the income distribution (shown by the Lorenz curve). If the 
distribution of the tax is more concentrated in the richer sections, then the tax is progressive. 
The index is computed as the difference between the “pseudo-Gini” or concentration index of 
the tax, minus the Gini index before the tax. The values can oscillate between –2 and 1. Th  
positive values indicate progressivity and the negative regressivity. Given the mentioned 
assumption of equality in the income distribution inside each country, very low figures can be 
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expected for the index, but what interest us is its sign and the comparison among the values in 
the different tax designs. In contrast with the former analysis in which each country was an 
observation that was equally represented in the table and the figure of added fiscal burden, now 
the inequality indicator would be more affected by what happens in a country with a larger 
population (to give an example, the fiscal burden on Luxembourg will have very little incidence 
on the global indicator) which can be considered a desired characteristic. Table III shows the 
results. 
 
Table III. Kakwani index for the different tax designs 
  
Kakwani index 
CO2 Tax -0.01933 
CO2-Energy Tax -0.01913 
CO2-Nuclear Tax -0.01462 
 
The negative signs of the results confirm that the considered taxes can be regressive. It 
can be noted that the last tax design, which is the one that most penalizes nuclear energy, and in 
our opinion much more appropriate from an environmental point of view, is also the one that 
would have a less regressive incidence.  
The Kakwani index is obtained from the global behavior of the concentration curves of 
the tax in comparison to the Lorenz curve of income distribution. The graphic analysis (Figure 
2) allows us to observe that, especially in the first case, the regressivity of the tax is explained to 
a great extent by the burden that is borne by the share of population that is located in the poorer 
EU countries. This would be considerably attenuated in the third tax, wich has  distribution of 
the fiscal burden more similar to the income distribution of the Community.  
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Figure 2. Lorenz curve and fiscal concentration curves of the different taxes 
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a rate of 30 euros, however the character of the redistribution, regressive or progressive, will be 
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Table IV. Redistributive capacity of the different tax designs 
 Gini index Reynolds-Smolensky index 
Initial situation 0.09751  
After CO2 tax 0.09792 -0.00041 
After CO2-Energy tax 0.09793 -0.00042 
After CO2-Nuclear tax 0.09787 -0.00036 
 
The signs show that the three taxes have a negative redistributive capacity. This 
negative redistribution is lower in the model that most penalizes nuclear energy while in the 
other two cases it is practically identical. 
 
4.3. The distributive effects with return of the revenues through lump-sum transfers.  
 
Next we analyze the distributive effects of these different tax alternatives assuming that 
the revenues obtained with the tax are transferred to the countries through lump-sum transfers 
according to the population of any member state. This assumption implies that it is more than a 
tax, it consists in what is known as a bonus-penalization system: no fiscal revenues are 
generated, some countries pay money while others receive it, and the sign of the transfer 
depends on the emissions being higher or lower than the EU mean. Although there are not fiscal 
revenues, polluting has a price equal to the tax rate fixed, given that for any unit of pollution 
money is paid or not received (opportunity cost).  
Notice that, the lump-sum redistribution could be considered equivalent in its 
redistributive effects among countries to a hypothetical additional public expenditure benefiting 
in an exactly equal way to all the citizens of the European Union. 
In the next table we can observe the effort in terms of (positive or negative) added fiscal 
burden (as % of GDP) that would represent the considered taxes. 
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Table V. Fiscal burden (as % of GDP) that represents each tax after lump-sum transfers 
 
  Net tax as a percentage of GDP
 Per capita income CO2 CO2-Energy CO2-Nuclear 
Portugal 10579 -1.00 -1.27 -1.69
Greece 11149 -0.22 -0.74 -1.05
Spain 14190 -0.47 -0.55 -0.60
Italy 19072 -0.25 -0.39 -0.70
France 22307 -0.50 -0.14 0.43
UK 22735 0.17 0.13 0.00
Belgium 22814 0.74 0.86 1.03
Netherlands 23373 0.49 0.44 0.00
Ireland 23381 0.51 0.26 -0.03
Finland 23540 0.63 0.62 0.87
Germany 24149 0.37 0.29 0.24
Austria 24153 -0.16 -0.29 -0.53
Sweden 25272 -0.55 -0.15 0.59
Denmark 30736 0.29 0.10 -0.10
Luxembourg 41230 1.07 0.88 0.57
     
EU 21147 0 0 0
 
The effect of the alternative taxes considered is now clearly different. In any of the 
alternatives, the four countries with a per capita income lower than the European mean receive a 
positive net transfer, and this is quite larger in the case of the later tax model, which is the one 
that most penalizes energy generated by nuclear power stations. Therefore, from the distribution 
point of view, lump-sum transfers would more than correct the moderate regressive impact of 
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the tax. Although, of course, the tax could have redistributive effects among different 
population sectors inside each country, which depends crucially on the use of tra sferred 
revenues. This is reflected in the following figure, where it can be observed that the burden that 
the tax net of transfers implies would have a positive correlation with the per capita income of 
the different countries.  
 
Figure 3. Fiscal burden added of the tax net of lump-sum transfers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the indicator of the redistributive capacity of the combination energy tax-lump-
sum transfers, the following results have been obtained:  
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In each of the three cases, the very weak redistributive capacity of the tax net of 
transfers is positive, that is to say, any of the studied measures would lead to a more equitable 
income distribution. As would be expected from the previous analysis, the measure with more 
redistributive capacity would be the one that most penalizes nuclear energy. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In the present paper we have analyzed what would be the redistributive impacts among 
the different countries of the European Union with the introduction of a tax on carbon emissions 
collected at a community level. First, we have examined the proposals made by the European 
Commission that basically consisted of a mixed tax CO2/Energy. The paper has highlighted 
some advantages of a unique tax collected at a EU-wide level with respect to harmonized taxes 
collected by the different countries. We havealso seen that both in the theoretical and empirical 
literature it is generally stated that energy taxation can be mildly regressive. Nevertheless, this 
depends both on the tax design as well as on how the revenues are used, which can attenuate the 
regressivity of the tax.  
We have analyzed the effects of the tax on the different EU countries under three 
designs of energy taxation: a pure tax on CO2, a mixed CO2/energy tax, and a CO2 tax with a 
strong burden on nuclear energy. Using the 1999 data we conclude that the application of the 
three taxes would be slightly regressive, although the degree of regressivity is smaller with the 
last design. The burden to be borne by the different countries depends in each case on their 
energy intensity, as well as on the weight of the different energy sources. Finally, we have 
shown that the regressive effect of the tax would be more than compensated if the revenues 
were returned to the countries according to its population.  
We can conclude, thus, that energy taxation a the EU level cannot be refused on equity 
grounds and it could even be defended for the potential progressive effects the use of collected 
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revenues could have. Moreover, we conclude that the tax alternative in which nuclear power is 
penalized is also the most interesting one in equity terms.  
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Notes 
 
1. “Cost” here means the sacrifice, measured in monetary terms, that the reduction of emissions is assumed to 
imply. 
2. However, in the case of the international tax an important incentive would exist to “hide” emissions (Hoel, 
1992). Although in the specific case of CO2 emissions, whose value is directly related to energy 
consumption, these possibilities would surely be quite limited for the developed countries. Anyway, it is a 
difficulty that has to be overcome for any international policy that imposes obligations and potential 
penalizations to different countries. 
3. But if the tax is introduced, as proposed in 1992 and 5, in a context of “revenue neutrality”, that is to 
say, without increasing the global fiscal burden, then there will not be additional revenues. 
4. Although, of course, we can be concerned about whether it will affect macroeconomics more negatively to 
the richest or to the poorest countries (see European Commission, 1993). Jansen and Klaasen (2000) 
analyze the effects of applying the last directive proposal of 1997 consisting in minimum harmonized taxes, 
and conclude that it could bear a small increase of th  GDP and a decrease of the emissions for most 
countries whenever the revenues are used to reduce social security contributions. 
5. In the CO2-energy tax, the positive effect derives from the reduction in the greenhouse emissions and its 
associated problems.  
6. In spite of the extreme uncertainty regarding the avoided costs (or “benefits”) some analyses like the one of 
Boyd et al. (1995) try to quantify them, and they conclude that the energy has a too low price, given the 
environmental damages it causes, and that a carbon tax would bear “net benefits”. 
7. The literature mentions the “double dividend” that these reforms could yield: on the one hand an 
environmental benefit and on the other hand an increase in employment if the reduction affects 
distortionary taxation of this factor (Pearce, 1991; Barker, 1995; Ekins, 1997; and Pezzey and Park, 1998). 
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8. Notice that emissions can be expressed in CO2 tons or carbon tons. The emission of 1 ton of carbon is equal 
to 3.67 tons of CO2, so the considered tax is equal to 183.5 Euros per ton of carbon (or near $165).  
9. An argument for justifying this would be that in the extraction of natural gas important quantities of 
methane, one of the main greenhouse gases, are emitted. 
10. The original formulation of the Reynolds-Smolensky (1977) index consisted in the difference between the 
initial Gini inequality index and the concentration index for the income after the application of the tax. 
However, it did not measure properly the redistributive effect in case of reranking of income units 
(Lambert, 1993). 
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